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executive summary
executive summary
 Inspired by research on the importance of 
entrepreneurship for sustained economic growth 
and improved wellbeing, many governments and 
non-governmental grantmaking organizations have 
sought over the past decade to implement policies 
and programs intended to support entrepreneurs. 
Over this interval, growing appreciation of the 
limits of strategies focused narrowly on financing or 
training entrepreneurs has prompted a number of 
such entities to shift their efforts toward more broad-
based strategies aimed at enabling “entrepreneurial 
ecosystems” at the city or sub-national regional scale. 
 This paper takes the metaphor of the 
“ecosystem” seriously, seeking to draw lessons from 
evolutionary biology and ecology to inform policy for 
entrepreneurship. In so doing, the paper provides a 
framework for data gathering and analysis of practical 
value in assessing the vibrancy of entrepreneurial 
ecosystems.
 Taking the ecosystem seriously as an economic 
model suggests the following strategies to enable 
entrepreneurial ecosystems:
•	 Favor	incumbents	less. Policies and 
regulations that favor incumbents—existing, 
dominant companies—create barriers to 
entry by new firms and restrict competition. 
Examples of such regulations include 
assertive enforcement of non-compete 
laws, excessively restrictive occupational 
licensing requirements, and various forms of 
regulatory complexity that inhibit contracting. 
Policymakers should avoid enacting such 
policies and regulations, instead working 
to reduce the disadvantages faced by 
entrepreneurial entrants into new and  
existing markets by favoring incumbents less.
•	 Listen	to	entrepreneurs. Rather than 
develop policies abstractly intended to  
correct “market failures,” policymakers 
should engage local entrepreneurs in person 
to develop and implement practically focused 
policies intended to encourage dynamism, 
increase diversity, and stimulate “metabolic” 
activity such as idea exploration, product 
development, and increased rates of  
deal flow.
•	 Map	the	ecosystem. Create an inventory 
or graph that indicates who the participants 
in the ecosystem are and how they are 
connected. More ambitiously, map roles and 
differentiate relationships by type, direction, 
and magnitude of interaction. Once validated 
by the entrepreneurs and community 
members, ecosystem maps can become 
valuable tools in developing strategies  
for engagement.
•	 Think	big,	start	small,	move	fast.	This 
simple rule, which applies to entrepreneurial 
ventures, also holds true for strategies to 
enable local entrepreneurial ecosystems. To be 
effective, such strategies should seek domains 
for early success and rapidly iterate forward 
from there to build well-grounded programs 
at scale. 
•	 Avoid	artificially	segmenting	your	
community	or	your	strategies. 
Entrepreneurs and members of 
entrepreneurial communities are not potted 
plants: they are active participants in a range 
of activities, such as creating new companies, 
investing in and/or advising startups, 
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i. introduction
 Entrepreneurship is present in all societies, but it 
manifests itself differently depending on the context.2 
Productive entrepreneurship corresponds to the 
creation and expansion of new firms; unproductive 
entrepreneurship corresponds to rent-seeking activities; 
destructive entrepreneurship corresponds to trafficking 
in illicit goods. All three forms of entrepreneurship 
create economic activity; however, institutions 
advance and societies progress only when the returns 
to productive entrepreneurship exceed those to 
unproductive and destructive entrepreneurship.3 While 
there is little evidence that government action can 
affect the overall supply of entrepreneurs in a given 
economy, there is strong evidence that it can influence 
where and how entrepreneurs—or entrepreneurially 
inclined individuals—focus their abilities.4 Strategies 
that support development on a national, regional, or 
local scale thus must consider not only the quality of 
the general business climate, but also, and importantly, 
how government actions affect the relative returns to 
different types of entrepreneurship. 
 Informed by research on entrepreneurship’s 
importance to sustained economic growth and 
wellbeing,5 non-governmental grantmaking 
organizations as well as governments around the 
mentoring entrepreneurs, teaching in formal 
settings, working at large corporations in 
research or market development, providing 
services such as legal or accounting, and 
serving as customers of entrepreneurial 
companies. Expect participants in 
entrepreneurial ecosystems to be playing 
multiple roles, and make sure to make the 
most of the unique skillsets of your most 
versatile community members.
•	 Prepare	to	capitalize	on	crises.	Much 
like a rotting trunk of a fallen tree feeds the 
growth of new saplings, economic disruption 
creates entrepreneurial opportunities. Because 
experiencing disruptions is an inevitable part 
of economic and social life, those involved in 
enabling entrepreneurial ecosystems should 
anticipate them and prepare to make the 
most of the opportunities they create.
 The search for effective strategies to enable local 
entrepreneurial ecosystems is a fundamentally practical 
one. Better understanding of actual ecosystems 
provides a conceptual framework within which 
policymakers can ask relevant questions, envision 
better approaches, and evaluate resultant outcomes. 
Keywords:	algorithms; complexity; entrepreneurship; 
entrepreneurial ecosystems; local competitiveness; 
recipes
“It is the systems so formed which, from the point of view of the ecologist, are the basic units of nature on the face of the earth. our natural human 
prejudices force us to consider the organisms (in the sense of the biologist) as 
the most important parts of these systems, but certainly the inorganic “factors” 
are also parts—there could be no systems without them, and there is constant 
interchange of the most various kinds within each system, not only between 
the organisms but between the organic and the inorganic. these ecosystems, 
as we may call them, are of the most various kinds and sizes. they form one 
category of the multitudinous physical systems of the universe, which range 
from the universe as a whole down to the atom.” 
—Arthur George Tansley1 
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world increasingly have sought strategies to encourage 
entrepreneurial initiatives and support entrepreneurial 
ventures.6 The growing interest in launching policies 
and programs that support entrepreneurship has 
intersected with increasing recognition by very 
different parties that entrepreneurship is a highly 
context-dependent activity, with the sub-national 
region, the city, or even the neighborhood being 
a more natural scale of analysis than is the nation. 
Furthermore, experience with programs that support 
entrepreneurs has called into question the effectiveness 
of interventions that focus solely on financing 
entrepreneurs or developing their personal abilities 
without paying specific attention to the operational 
context.7 As a consequence, institutional innovators 
inside and outside of government have come to frame 
entrepreneurship-related interventions as aiming to 
enable “entrepreneurial ecosystems” specifically at 
the city or sub-national regional scale as much as to 
support entrepreneurs directly.8 
 Academic research has failed to keep up with 
governments’ and non-governmental grantmaking 
organizations’ recent interest in entrepreneurship 
as a central element in local competitiveness. To be 
sure, as just noted, scholarly research for the past 
century has addressed entrepreneurship’s importance 
to development and growth. A parallel, comparably 
robust literature has explored the link between 
local characteristics and entrepreneurial vibrancy.9 
However, while rigorous studies abound regarding 
entrepreneurship, the entrepreneurial process, and 
national-scale policy initiatives, few comparably 
rigorous studies have been conducted on the 
effectiveness of interventions like those on which 
practitioners are currently focused—that is, those 
intended to enable local entrepreneurial ecosystems.10 
 There are various reasons for the relative 
immaturity of the research on entrepreneurial 
ecosystems at the city or the sub-national regional 
scale. In this paper, I propose that these reasons include 
the following: the default theoretical architecture 
in economics is not well suited to describing 
entrepreneurial ecosystems, assessing their vibrancy 
(or lack thereof), or recommending policies that may 
improve their function.11 
 My objective in this paper is to take the idea 
of the “entrepreneurship ecosystem” seriously and 
to consider what sort of guidance researchers and 
policymakers can gain by making a direct comparison 
to the substantial literature on ecosystems in the 
fields of evolutionary biology and ecology. There is, 
of course, nothing novel in theorizing that economic 
systems are analogous to biological systems. Nelson 
and Winter’s work is a particularly significant landmark 
in this literature, but it goes back at least as far as 
Herbert Spencer’s 1857 essay, “Progress: Its Law 
and Cause.”12 In this paper, I sketch a future path 
for this line of inquiry, arguing along the way that 
developments over the last quarter century in both 
economics and theoretical biology have substantially 
narrowed the representational gap between economics 
and the life sciences, to the point where the analogy 
to evolutionary biology and ecology actually starts to 
provide some tangible insights into the functioning of 
economic systems.
 The quote that opens this paper is from a 1935 
paper by Sir Arthur Tansley, titled, “The Use and 
Abuse of Vegetational Concepts and Terms,” in which 
Tansley introduced the term “ecosystem.” As the quote 
suggests, evolutionary biologists in the 1930s were as 
naturally inclined to place “the organism” at the center 
of their inquiry as economists in that decade were to 
place “the firm” at the center of production theory. 
Tansley’s insight was that dynamically stable networks 
of interconnected organisms and inorganic resources 
constitute their own distinct domain of analysis. Just 
as I argue in this paper that we cannot consider the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem simply as a “complex firm,” 
Tansley rebelled against the application of the term 
“complex organism” to such networks “because 
the term is already in common use for an individual 
higher animal or plant, and because the biome is not 
an organism except in the sense in which inorganic 
systems are organisms.”13 
 To support that conclusion, I offer some of the 
ways that, according to the argument that follows, 
a baseline evolutionary/ecological perspective 
on entrepreneurial ecosystems departs from the 
neoclassical/default (Table 1):14 
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 The bulk of the paper consists of an elaboration of 
these points.
 I begin Section II by defining “entrepreneurship” 
(following Schumpeter) as the creation of new 
combinations—a definition that creates a bridge 
between biological and economic representations  
of novelty and exchange in ecosystems. In  
Section III, I describe the relationship between 
algorithmic complexity (the consequence of the 
successive creation of new combinations over time) 
and economic opportunity. In Section IV, I explain how 
market failures are fundamental to the creation of 
economic opportunity. In Section V, I address issues 
of political economy as they relate to the evolution of 
economic opportunity, and describe how a favorable 
business climate depends on entrepreneurship. 
In Section VI, I offer some strategies for enabling 
entrepreneurial ecosystems that emphasize diversity, 
dynamism, and deal flow. In Section VII, I offer some 
cautionary thoughts about using methodologies of 
formal assessment in implementing strategies to enable 
entrepreneurship. I conclude my thoughts in  
Section VIII.
table 1:  
evolutionary/ecological perspective on entrepreneurial ecosystems departs from the neoclassical/default
Default: Entrepreneurship is one 
factor among many in an economy-
wide aggregate production function.
Default: Imperfect appropriability of 
the returns from an entrepreneurial 
initiative is a primary impediment to 
entrepreneurial success because the 
most valuable firm-level production 
functions (a.k.a. “recipes”) are simple 
and can easily be copied.
Default: market failures and 
economic crises undermine 
entrepreneurs.
Evolutionary/Ecological: 
Entrepreneurship is not a factor in a 
fixed, aggregate production function 
but, rather, the process of creating 
new firm-level production recipes 
that can be represented as production 
functions.
Evolutionary/Ecological:  
Imperfect appropriability of the 
returns from an entrepreneurial 
initiative is a secondary impediment 
to entrepreneurial success because the 
most valuable firm-level production 
functions (a.k.a. “recipes”) are 
complex and cannot easily be copied. 
Evolutionary/Ecological:  
market failures and economic crises 
create opportunities for entrepreneurs.
these theoretical differences also imply different practical strategies to encourage entrepreneurship:
Default: Entrepreneurship depends on 
a favorable business climate.
Default: If entrepreneurship generates 
positive spillovers and thus is an 
undersupplied input, government 
policy should subsidize educational 
institutions to increase their 
production of entrepreneurs.
Default: conventional, formal 
program evaluation is essential to 
enabling entrepreneurial ecosystems.
Evolutionary/Ecological:  
A favorable business climate depends 
on entrepreneurship.
Evolutionary/Ecological: 
Entrepreneurship policy potentially 
can increase economic vibrancy by 
enabling entrepreneurial ecosystems, 
but doing so is not as simple as 
merely subsidizing the production of 
an undersupplied input.
Evolutionary/Ecological: 
conventional, formal evaluation is 
unlikely to be of significant value in 
enabling entrepreneurial ecosystems.
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ii. entrePreneursHiP 
is tHe creation oF 
neW comBinations
 A word of warning at the outset is in order: 
throughout this paper I will mix two metaphors, 
persistently and (mostly) unrepentantly. 
 The first metaphor is that of the “recipe.” This is 
not really a metaphor, as the culinary recipe is actually a 
specific example of the general concept to which I am 
referring. In the first paper to suggest that the recipe 
might be the basis for a neo-Schumpeterian theory of 
the firm, Winter (1968) states: 
If the technology is that of cake baking, the 
standard economics of the firm describes 
that technology solely in terms of the list of 
ingredients. Here the “ingredients” must be 
understood to include so many oven-hours, 
so many labor-hours of the cook, as well as 
eggs and flour. But “knowing how to bake 
a cake” is clearly not the same thing as 
“knowing how to bring together all of the 
ingredients for a cake.” Knowing how to 
bake a cake is knowing how to execute the 
sequence of operations that are specified, 
more or less closely, in a cake recipe. The list 
of ingredients is understood to be contained 
in the recipe, but the recipe is not fully 
revealed by the list of ingredients.16 
 Production recipes are implicit in the neoclassical 
theory of production, but they are not explicitly 
represented anywhere.17 But the basic idea is very 
simple: a recipe is just the algorithm employed to 
transform inputs into outputs (where the outputs may 
be a service or another recipe), more or less exactly as 
in the culinary instance.
 The second metaphor is that of the “ecosystem,” 
as just described. From a modeling standpoint, the 
connection is a natural one: the model of production 
recipes introduced in Auerswald et al. (2000) is 
itself based on a specific formalization of “fitness 
landscapes” within evolutionary biology introduced 
by Kauffman and Levin (1987), which, in turn, 
derives from Wright (1932). When I appeal to the 
conceptual structure of the ecosystem to describe 
the environment in which entrepreneurs operate, 
algorithms of production will correspond to genotypes 
(also analogous to recipes); specific firms employing 
those algorithms will correspond to phenotypes; 
entrepreneurship will correspond to genetic 
recombination; and the creation of new industries will 
correspond to speciation.18 
 I will thus use “new combinations” and “new 
production recipes“ interchangeably when referring to 
entrepreneurship: 
Creating	new	combinations	
↕		
Creating	new	production	recipes		
↕	
Entrepreneurship
 Just like culinary recipes, production recipes are 
comprised of discrete tasks that yield a well-specified 
output when performed in combination. The individual 
tasks themselves can be the subject of experimentation. 
Each task may be refined, and different arrangements 
of tasks (which is to say, different recipes) will result 
in different outputs. Importantly, some tasks may be 
performed using tacit knowledge and therefore will not 
be encoded anywhere. 
 The next section defines complexity in production, 
upon which is based my definition of progress in 
regional development—and therefore the ultimate 
source of local competitiveness.
introduction  |  entrePreneursHiP is tHe creation oF neW comBinations
“the carrying out of new combinations we call “enterprise;” the individuals whose function it is to carry them out we call 
“entrepreneurs.” 
—Joseph Schumpeter15
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iii. comPLexity drives 
oPPortunity
 In one of the most highly cited papers in the 
management literature, Teece et al. (1997) wrote: 
“The competitive advantage of firms is seen as resting 
on distinctive processes (ways of coordinating and 
combining), shaped by the firm’s (specific) asset 
positions (such as the firm’s portfolio of difficult-to-
trade knowledge assets and complementary assets), 
and the evolution path(s) it has adopted or inherited.”20 
The competitive advantage of regions is similarly in 
capabilities that are not easily copied or replaced by 
tradable goods.21 
 This statement and the above discussion of 
“production recipes” both suggest that the ideas 
that actually propel growth and development are 
overwhelmingly uncodified, context dependent, and 
transferable only at significant cost—which is to say, 
tacit knowledge dominates, information asymmetries 
are the norm, and transaction costs are significant.22 
To the extent that a new method is easily imitable, the 
profits earned by an innovator will be short lived.23 
Imitation of complex production recipes is almost 
always imperfect—sometimes disastrously so—because 
modifications in the practices of one unit within the 
firm will affect the effectiveness of multiple other 
units.24 Because a simple production recipe can easily 
be imitated, it is not likely to yield persistent “above 
normal” profits to an early adopter. The most enticing 
opportunities for disruptive entrepreneurship are 
typically those that require the greatest coordination 
and have the greatest inherent complexity, as these 
ventures are the most difficult to imitate when 
successfully launched.25 The primary pathway by 
which complexity affects market structure and local 
competitiveness is via the obstacles to imitation that 
complexity may endogenously create.
 Given the continued influence of the specific New 
Growth formulation famously advanced by Romer 
(1986, 1990), in which ideas are “non-rival” and “non-
excludable,” and economically relevant innovations are 
characteristically subject to “knowledge spillovers,”26 it 
is worth emphasizing that the information-theoretical/
ecological perspective advanced in this paper implies 
that entrepreneurship characteristically involves 
the search for ideas that are, in fact, rivalrous and 
excludable (at least temporarily), out of which ventures 
with proprietary value can be created. Furthermore, 
while “knowledge spillovers” of the type emphasized 
by Romer (and followers) clearly exist, they are of 
marginal relevance in the practical work of creating the 
new business entities that drive economic growth and 
development.27 The impediments to entrepreneurship 
that matter most are the everyday battles involved 
in communicating ideas, building trust, and making 
deals.28 Efforts to enable entrepreneurial ecosystems 
must be directed toward easing these struggles.
 The next section is devoted to correcting another 
conceptual error often made in conceiving strategies 
to enable entrepreneurial ecosystems: that the goal of 
interventions is to reduce or eliminate (static) market 
failures. We shall see that the opposite is true; that is, 
(static) market failures provide a vital source of energy 
to propel entrepreneurial initiatives. It is because 
market failures are pervasive and self-renewing that 
entrepreneurship—in one form or another—is a 
globally ubiquitous phenomenon.
“the creative spark on which serendipity depends, in short, is to see bridges where others see holes. ” 
—Ronald Burt29
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iv. marKet 
FaiLures create 
oPPortunities For 
entrePreneurs30
 Whereas conventional wisdom among economists 
and policymakers is that eliminating market failures will 
encourage entrepreneurial activity, the reality is that the 
greater the intensity of a market failure, the stronger 
the potential value of an entrepreneurial  
new combination. 
 At one level, this claim can be justified in a very 
straightforward manner: in an environment of perfect 
competition where the actions of existing firms fulfill 
the first welfare theorem (Pareto efficiency achieved via 
market transactions) and the actions of government 
fulfill the second welfare theorem (equity achieved via 
ex post redistribution of wealth), there would be no 
market space for, much less need for, entrepreneurship. 
Even allowing for short-term rigidities in entry and exit 
and exogenously driven fluctuations in demand, the 
only motivation to create a new venture would be to 
replicate an existing economic combination.31 
 In the Coasean framework, transaction costs 
are the glue that holds a firm together. When the 
magnitude of transaction costs increases somewhere in 
the economy, it follows that new firms may be created 
and existing firms may either combine or expand (by 
incorporating transactions previously mediated through 
the market).32 
 Burt (2004) takes this further, describing 
how transaction costs combined with information 
asymmetries are not only the basis for intellectual 
arbitrage but also for the creation of new conceptual 
combinations. In prior work, Burt established the critical 
role played by the few people within an organization 
who have the capacity to bridge the “structural holes” 
that exist as a natural consequence of functional 
specialization and the separation of organizations into 
distinct clusters. Burt (2004) extends this to describe 
how those same individuals are disproportionately 
responsible for creating new ideas: “Whether in 
communities or in a geographical region, divisions in a 
corporation, groups within a profession, or members of 
a team, people specialize within clusters and integrate 
via bridges across clusters.”33 
 The structural holes both within and between 
organizations that Burt has documented in a 
substantial body of work exist due to market failures 
of various types. They create opportunities for those 
who “see bridges where others see holes”—a concise 
description of the entrepreneurial mindset. Ironically, 
then, the renewal of structural holes—and the 
persistence of the market failures on which they are 
based—is a prerequisite for entrepreneurship.34 
 Until recently, the relationship between complexity, 
capabilities, and development was a matter of 
conjecture. However, thanks to a groundbreaking 
empirical study published in 2009 and further work 
since by Ricardo Hausmann, César Hidalgo, and their 
coauthors, this conjecture is at last being subject to 
empirical testing. Hausmann and Hidalgo summarize 
their results as follows: 
We have presented a technique that uses 
available economic data to develop measures 
comPLexity drives oPPortunity  | 
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of the complexity of products and of countries, 
and showed that (i) these measures capture 
information about the complexity of the set  
of capabilities available in a country;  
(ii) are strongly correlated with income per 
capita; (iii) are predictive of future growth; 
and (iv) are predictive of the complexity of 
a country’s future exports, making a strong 
empirical case that the level of development 
is indeed associated to the complexity of a 
country’s economy.35 
 The approach taken in Hidalgo and Hausmann 
(2009), Hausmann and Hildalgo (2011), and Hausmann 
et al. (2011) is fundamentally combinatorial, inspired 
(like this paper) by Kauffman (1988, 1993) and 
synchronous with Weitzman (1998). The matrix of 
products and underlying capabilities that is the core 
of the analysis in Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009) 
corresponds quite closely to an economic food web, 
in which less-complex production recipes create 
products that are then “consumed” by more-complex 
production recipes—very much in keeping with the 
classic notion of succession in biological systems, as 
described by Tansley above.36 
 While Hausmann and Hildalgo have conducted 
their work on maps of economic complexity at the 
national level, only data limitations impede the 
application of their model to a sub-national region. 
At that scale, Jacobs (1961, 1969, 1984) was the first 
to relate the creation of new combinations to growth 
and development, thereby advancing the hypothesis 
that diversity, not specialization, is the key to vitality 
in cities.37 A pioneering empirical study of growth in 
a cross-section of U.S. cities by Glaeser et al. (1992) 
found that, “at the city-industry level, specialization 
hurts, competition helps, and city diversity helps 
employment growth.” Subsequent studies by 
Henderson et al. (1995) and Feldman and Audretsch 
(1999) concluded that economic diversity is important 
in explaining new firm creation and innovative  
output, respectively.
 Saxenian (1994) argues similarly that regions 
in this view are best understood “as networks of 
relationships rather than as collections of atomistic 
firms.”38 The source of regional technological 
advantage lies not in vague and unmeasurable 
knowledge spillovers but in the highly tangible 
flexibility of economic actors to organize and 
reorganize flexibly as the need arises.39 In a detailed 
study of Silicon Valley social networks, Castilla et al. 
(2000) note that “dense networks not only within 
but between sectors of engineers, educators, venture 
capitalists, lawyers, and accountants are important 
channels for the diffusion of technical and market 
information.” The exchange of ideas within such 
networks is largely purposive, building “weak ties”  
that facilitate transactions.40 
 In regional economics, these results are well 
known. What the work of Hausmann and Hildalgo 
has done is to indicate for the first time the existence 
of a bridge between formal microeconomic models of 
production grounded in evolutionary biology and the 
sort of structure-preserving empirical inquiry that takes 
the ecological metaphor seriously.
 In the next section, I go in a different direction to 
discuss how considerations of political economy bear 
upon the design and implementation of strategies 
to enable entrepreneurial ecosystems. Then, in 
sections VI and VII, I refer back to complexity to offer 
some suggestions for practical strategies to enable 
entrepreneurial ecosystems.
The source of regional technological advantage lies not in vague and 
unmeasurable knowledge spillovers but in the highly tangible flexibility of 
economic actors to organize and reorganize flexibly as the need arises.39
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v. a FavoraBLe 
Business cLimate 
dePends on 
entrePreneursHiP
 Support for entrepreneurship and innovation 
is often confused with generic strengthening of the 
overall “business climate.” What is the difference? The 
business climate pertains to all firms—both incumbents 
and new entrants. Some elements of the business 
climate (e.g., the time required to register a new 
business or the difficulty of obtaining business licenses) 
are particularly relevant to entrepreneurship. However, 
others (e.g., the stability of the financial sector) may 
actually reflect the concentration of market power and 
barriers to entrepreneurial entry.42 
 Entrepreneurship of the type I focus on in 
this paper (i.e., Schumpeterian entrepreneurship) 
is an inherently disequilibrium phenomenon that 
takes place in a world characterized by uncertainty, 
asymmetric information, indivisibilities, and non-zero 
transaction costs. As Mancur Olson put it (see quote 
above), “Because uncertainties are so pervasive and 
unfathomable, the most dynamic and prosperous 
societies are those that try many, many different  
things. They are societies with countless thousands  
of entrepreneurs.”43 
 This is the very reason why entrepreneurship 
policy has come to the fore in countries around the 
world. Development is an ongoing process of social 
change, and one subject to regular disruption, that 
involves institutions, culture, and technology. While 
societies can advance for a short while by making 
incremental adjustments to the status quo, long-term 
development requires entrepreneurship and innovation. 
As Hirschman noted, “Development depends not 
so much on finding optimal combinations for given 
resources and factors of production as on calling forth 
and enlisting for development purposes resources and 
abilities that are hidden, scattered, or poorly utilized.”44 
 Entrepreneurs and innovators exist in all 
societies, but not all societies are equally welcoming 
of the disruptive changes they provoke. Individual 
entrepreneurs and innovators thus face three options: 
seek economic rents within the status quo; challenge 
the status quo through disruptive innovation; or 
leave the society altogether to seek an environment 
more welcoming of economic creativity. These three 
options (taken in reverse order) are analogous to the 
fundamental political options articulated by Hirschman 
long ago: exit, voice, and loyalty.45 
 When too large a portion of potential innovators 
and entrepreneurs choose either to seek rents within 
the context of the status quo or to leave the society 
altogether, development slows or comes to a halt. If 
the above statements are in fact true, then creating 
a place for the future in any country means creating 
a space for entrepreneurship and innovation—and, 
in particular, encouraging the subset of potential 
entrepreneurs and innovators who choose neither  
to conform nor to depart but to stay and build 
something new.
“A  modern economy is a wondrously complex system that continually converges toward general equilibrium. but it always fails to reach 
equilibrium because it incessantly faces new opportunities and shocks. 
there is not even enough information to calculate the present situation 
of an economy with any detail or accuracy, much less its future position 
. . . because uncertainties are so pervasive and unfathomable, the most 
dynamic and prosperous societies are those that try many, many different 
things. they are societies with countless thousands of entrepreneurs.” 
—Mancur Olson41 
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 Conventional wisdom holds that a country can 
become a 21st-century entrepreneurial economy 
only after its political institutions have fully matured. 
However, the actual development experience of 
advanced industrialized economies arguably tells 
a different story: a country’s political institutions 
mature only as its economy produces broad-based 
opportunities on a sustainable basis.46 If so, then 
internal security and political stability are not 
prerequisites for, but the consequence of, broad- 
based social development that is driven by competition 
and entrepreneurship and supported by increasing 
levels of social trust. Actions taken in the name of 
near-term stability that undermine competition and 
economic dynamism not only make a country less 
prosperous, they also make it (dynamically) less secure 
and less stable.
 If there is more to enabling entrepreneurial 
ecosystems than “strengthening the business climate,” 
then what constitutes a viable strategy or set of 
strategies? I consider this question next.
“An entrepreneurial ecosystem implies cooperative and productive relationships among different organizations. In many countries, these 
relationships are between startups, established companies, universities, 
and research institutions. In a vibrant ecosystem, people and ideas flow 
between these organizations, starting new ventures, joining existing ones, 
and linking innovations together.” 
—Global Entrepreneurship Congress47 
vi. Promote 
diversity, ecouraGe 
dynamism, and drive 
deaL FLoW
 As early as 1963, anthropologist Clifford Geertz 
noted of Javanese traders, “What the entrepreneurial 
group of . . . small businessmen most lacks is not 
capital . . . or drive . . . or a sufficient market. What 
they lack is the power to mobilize their capital and 
channel their drive in such a way as to exploit the 
existing market possibilities. They lack the capacity 
to form efficient economic institutions; they are 
entrepreneurs without enterprises.”48 A half-century 
later, a huge disparity still exists between low- and 
high-income countries in terms of what small and 
growing businesses contribute to economic growth  
and employment.
 The relative dearth of small and growing 
businesses in low-income countries is sometimes 
referred to as the missing middle. The motivation 
for this term is illustrated by Figure 1 from Ayyagari 
et al., which displays the historical contributions 
made to economic output and employment by small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs) in both low- and 
high-income countries. The contrast is striking and 
significant. In high-income countries, SMEs are 
responsible for more than half of both gross domestic 
product (GDP) and employment; in low-income 
countries, SMEs count for less than one-fifth of GDP 
and employment, and the dominant contributors to 
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economic activity are the unregistered microenterprises 
that constitute the “informal sector.”49 
 There is more to these figures than simple 
accounting. These data represent the fundamental 
economic imbalances present in places that lack 
dynamic entrepreneurial ecosystems. Institutional 
resources that are taken for granted in the most 
successful entrepreneurial regions—access to 
managerial talent, mentoring, and growth capital—are, 
in many places, absent or insufficient. As a result, in the 
places that would most benefit from entrepreneur-led 
development, talent is trapped in two places: in very 
small, low-productivity microenterprises that have little 
potential for expansion, capital accumulation, or job 
creation; and in very large ventures that benefit from 
economies of scale but often lag behind their SME 
counterparts in terms of innovation and growth. 
 While all new and rapidly growing firms initially 
fall into the category of SMEs, it is important to note 
that—data in Figure 1 notwithstanding—implementing 
strategies to accelerate entrepreneurship is not the 
same as building institutions to support SMEs. SMEs 
are small, but they are not necessarily new or growing. 
Schumpeterian ventures are new and innovative, 
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Figure 1. Small and medium enterprise (SME) contribution 
to GDP and employment in low-income and 
high-income countries.
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Source: Aspen Network of Development Entrepreneurs (2009), based on data from Ayyagari et al. (2003). 
Reprinted under Creative Commons License.
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but when successful they do not remain small or 
midsize for long. Indeed, programs to support SMEs, if 
improperly conceived and implemented, may actually 
undermine entrepreneurship if they diminish incentives 
for entrepreneurial innovation and growth-directed 
strategies—for example, by creating a program of 
subsidies not available to firms that grow beyond a 
certain size. 
 A failing entrepreneurial ecosystem is one in 
which there is no viable bridge linking small and large 
firms. Small family businesses are essentially precluded 
from growing into large firms due to limitations of 
managerial oversight; large corporations rarely invest 
in or develop small enterprises. Even buyer-supplier 
relationships with subcontractors—which are key to the 
functioning of large firms in advanced industrialized 
countries—are either poorly developed or absent in 
most industries. The economic environment lacks, 
in addition to trust, an ecosystem that connects the 
various levels of the private sector: large corporations, 
innovative high-growth firms, and microenterprises. 
As in a rainforest (see Figure 2), the challenge is how 
to bring all of those levels into an ecosystem where 
they’re working and reinforcing one another.
 My argument so far suggests that there is every 
reason to believe that the underlying problem solved 
by an entrepreneur will be complex and, consequently, 
that any solution found to the problem will not be 
easily copied. Furthermore, as Olson describes, there 
is ample reason to believe that well-intentioned 
Figure 2. The forest ecosystem
Source: Mongabay.com. Reprinted under Creative Commons license.
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efforts to create a “business-friendly” environment 
are likely to result in interventions that enhance, 
or at least reinforce, the advantages of market-
leading incumbents.50 If this is true, then the implied 
strategy is very different: rather than seeking to build 
product-based clusters through targeted subsidies for 
incumbent firms, political actors and policymakers 
should, whenever feasible, seek opportunities to reduce 
subsidies for incumbents and broaden pathways for 
entrepreneurs to enter domestic markets. 
 Entrepreneurs repeatedly report that conventional 
tools of business-friendly policy, such as tax incentives, 
grants, and local regulations, have little relevance to 
their success or to the vitality of local entrepreneurial 
ecosystems. Entrepreneurs instead emphasize the 
importance of access to networks, quality of life, and 
other intangibles. A recent report by Endeavor (a global 
organization dedicated to supporting entrepreneurs), 
based on interviews of 150 founders of high-growth 
firms in the United States, found the following: 
•	 Entrepreneurs	at	fast-growing	firms	usually	
decide where to live based on personal 
connections and quality of life factors many 
years before they start their firms. 
•	 These	founders	value	a	pool	of	talented	
employees more than any other business-
related resource that cities can offer. 
•	 Access	to	customers	and	suppliers	is	the	
second most valuable business-related 
resource that cities can provide, according  
to these entrepreneurs. 
•	 The	founders	in	our	study	rarely	cite  
low tax rates or business-friendly regulations  
as reasons for starting a business in a  
specific city.51 
 A World Economic Forum survey of more than 
1,000 entrepreneurs in forty-three countries found 
similarly that the elements of the ecosystem of 
greatest concern to entrepreneurs are funding and 
finance, human resources, and market opportunity, 
with government and regulatory issues a comparably 
significant concern only among entrepreneurs in the 
Middle East and Africa.52 
 Given these realities and the foregoing analysis, 
I offer a few principles for enabling entrepreneurial 
ecosystems:
 Favor	incumbents	less.	Where governments 
and multinational institutions such as the World Bank 
have become increasingly interested in identifying and 
implementing programs to support entrepreneurs, 
they also have continued to engage in conventional 
development practices that arguably have the 
unintended consequence of obstructing the emergence 
of the very entrepreneurial culture that the former 
programs seek to develop. Given these realities, 
wherever particular actors in national governments and 
international NGOs who are interested in supporting 
entrepreneurs have the latitude to do so, they should 
focus primarily on adjusting the full portfolio of 
interventions so it favors incumbents less. There may 
be little point in creating a single program to enable 
entrepreneurial ecosystems if ten other programs 
exist in parallel that undermine entrepreneurs’ 
ability to succeed because they intensify the power 
of entrenched economic (and, often, political) 
incumbents—in both the “beneficiary” country and 
the “donor” countries. Subsidies to incumbent firms 
(both direct and indirect) and other policies aimed at 
short-term goals such as job creation may end up being 
counterproductive when their longer term, dynamic 
effects on competition are taken into consideration. 
Entrepreneurs repeatedly report that conventional tools of  
business-friendly policy, such as tax incentives, grants, and local regulations, 
have little relevance to their success or to the vitality of local 
entrepreneurial ecosystems.
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Regulatory advantages governments confer on incumbents  
are at least as damaging to the emergence of entrepreneurial ecosystems  
as fiscal advantages are.
 Regulatory advantages governments confer on 
incumbents are at least as damaging to the emergence 
of entrepreneurial ecosystems as fiscal advantages are. 
For example, Starr et al. (2014) discussed the increasing 
use of non-compete agreements in the U.S. labor force 
as a deterrent to entrepreneurial entry and competition; 
Kleiner and Krueger (2013) and Kleiner et al. (2014) 
undertake a similar analysis focused on occupational 
licensing. Generally, from the standpoint of standard 
theory, there are at least four ways in which regulation 
may create obstacles to entrepreneurs seeking to enter 
an industry with service-improving innovations: 
1. By increasing the overall cost of doing 
business within an industry53 
2. By explicitly treating incumbents more 
favorably than new entrants54 
3. By implicitly imposing a regulatory risk on  
new entrants that is greater than that faced 
by incumbents
4. By creating regulatory complexity that favors 
incumbents who have already worked their 
way down “compliance learning curves”55 
 Of these dimensions of regulations’ impact  
on competition, all but the fourth have been studied 
extensively as “unintended consequences” that 
should be considered by a presumably dispassionate 
regulator.56 
 There are many structural reasons why we 
might expect regulatory agencies to represent the 
interests of the most powerful incumbents rather 
than those of new entrants. As venture capitalist and 
complexity theorist John Chisholm observes, “Industry 
regulations co-evolve over decades with the major 
players in those industries. Just having lived through 
and intimately knowing the regulatory history gives 
entrenched players an advantage over new entrants, 
and regulatory complexity works to the benefit of 
these entrenched players.”57 The longer an industry 
exists as a well-defined market entity (implying multiple 
dimensions of underlying market stability), the more 
likely that incumbents will employ regulation as an anti-
competitive tactic. 
 The conscious use of regulation by incumbent 
firms as an entry-constraining tactic is analogous to 
what biologists refer to as “defensive complexity.” 
Using the more general term “control systems” as 
a biological equivalent for economic “regulation,” 
Chastain, Antia, and Bergstrom (2012) describe how, 
when incumbents employ defensive complexity as 
a strategy, stasis rather than dynamism can result in 
otherwise highly competitive environments: “Where 
sufficient defensive complexity is in place, antagonistic 
co-evolution can lead to long periods of structural 
stasis instead of rapid change.”58 
	 Listen	to	entrepreneurs. As Rodrik points 
out, “The conventional approach to industrial policy 
consists of enumerating technological and other 
externalities and then targeting policy interventions 
on these market failures. The discussion then revolves 
around the administrative and fiscal feasibility of these 
policy interventions, their informational requirements, 
their political-economic consequences, and so on.”59 
This default process generally leaves the ostensible 
“beneficiaries” of policy—entrepreneurs and members 
of the communities in which they reside—on the 
sidelines until a policy is implemented. Such an 
approach simply cannot work if the objective is to 
enable entrepreneurial ecosystems. For one thing, 
the objective is not to address market failures but to 
encourage dynamism, promote diversity, and, above 
all, increase metabolic activity (ideas explored, products 
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prototyped and sold, services offered, deals closed) in a 
particular locality. These activities cannot take place at 
a distance. They require not only positive engagement 
but also responsive listening. As Motoyama et al. 
found in their study of a particular effort to enable 
the entrepreneurial ecosystem in Kansas City, “If the 
public sector or entrepreneurship support organizations 
attempt to engage entrepreneurs, they should target 
local sources and in-person events.”60 
 Map	the	Ecosystem. Creating open and 
trusted lines of communication between members of 
entrepreneurial communities and those who would 
support, and grow, their efforts creates a context 
in which it is possible to map the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem. At its simplest, an ecosystem map is a 
simple relational inventory (or graph) that indicates 
who the participants in the ecosystem are (nodes) and 
how they are connected (edges). More ambitiously, a 
map may describe roles and differentiate relationships 
by type, direction, and magnitude of interaction. 
The particulars of the map matter less than what it 
is used for—to identify central players, key relational 
structures, and linked domains of capabilities. Once 
validated by the entrepreneurs and community 
members, ecosystem maps may become valuable tools 
in developing strategies for engagement.
	 Think	big,	start	small,	move	fast.61 This simple 
rule, which applies for entrepreneurial ventures, also 
holds true for strategies intended to enable local 
entrepreneurial ecosystems. Adaptive learning is not 
just an assessment methodology; it is the practice of 
implementation itself. Seek domains for early success 
and rapidly iterate forward from there to build well-
grounded programs at scale.
	 Avoid	artificially	segmenting	your	community	
and	your	strategies. The ecosystem metaphor helps 
remind those planning interventions that entrepreneurs 
and members of entrepreneurial communities are not 
potted plants: they do not conform to fixed categories, 
and they do not remain still. Active participants in 
entrepreneurial ecosystems typically will sequentially 
or simultaneously engage in more than one of the 
following activities:
•	 Leading	or	being	part	of	an	entrepreneurial	
team in the creation of a new venture 
•	 Acting	as	an	equity	investor	in,	and/or	formal	
advisor to, one or more other ventures
•	 Mentoring	other	entrepreneurs
•	 Teaching	in	a	formal	setting
•	 Working	at	a	large	corporation	either	in	
research and development or market-facing 
activities
•	 Providing	a	service	(legal,	marketing,	
accounting, etc.) to entrepreneurs and  
new ventures
•	 Acting	as	a	buyer	for	goods	and	services	
provided by entrepreneurs and new ventures
 Expect participants in entrepreneurial ecosystems 
to be playing multiple roles and make sure to make 
the most of the unique skillsets of your most versatile 
community members.. 
 Prepare	to	capitalize	on	crises. In a rainforest, 
the rotting trunk of a fallen tree feeds the growth of 
new trees by releasing nutrients formerly locked within 
its cell walls. These “spinoff” saplings are doubly 
well-positioned by being naturally situated above a 
nutrient source on the forest floor and below a newly 
At its simplest, an ecosystem map is a simple relational inventory  
(or graph) that indicates who the participants in the ecosystem are  
(nodes) and how they are connected (edges).
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created gap in the canopy above. Sunlight to a sapling 
is comparable to customers to a small and growing 
firm. Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of 
the dynamics of exploitation, conservation, release, 
and reorganization in a forest ecosystem, including 
reference to the ecological concept of succession that I 
introduced at the start of this paper. 
 A directly analogous phenomenon occurs in 
economic ecosystems. Simply put, disruption creates 
entrepreneurial opportunities. This holds at both the 
regional level and the firm level. In the mid-1950s, 
the economy of the Santa Clara Valley in California 
was disrupted when (following the end of the Korean 
War) then-secretary of defense Charles Erwin Wilson 
cut the U.S. military budget by $11 billion, eliminating 
40,000 civilian jobs along the way.62 These cuts 
coincided with the beginning of an era in that region 
in which a significant number of radio and electrical 
engineers joined or created the companies that 
turned the northern end of Santa Clara Valley into 
Silicon Valley. When the Defense Department made 
cuts of a comparable magnitude in the mid-1980s, 
entrepreneurial ecosystems in Northern Virginia and in 
San Diego received a similar boost.63 
Figure 3. Succession and reorganization of 
ecosystem as represented by Bengtsson et al.
Arrows close to each other indicate rapid changes; arrows far from each other indicate slow changes. 
Following Holling et al. (1995), Bengtsson et al. (2000) note that “diversity in forested landscapes is 
needed for the transitions between all the four stages, which is why managed forests must be managed so 
a sufficient number of species is available for the cycle to continue.
Source: Image from Bengtsson et al. (2000).
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 Providing further evidence of a positive correlation 
between economic disruption and entrepreneurial 
opportunity at a national scale in the United States, 
Stangler finds that more than half of the Fortune 500 
companies were started during a recession.64 
 The international evidence does not contradict 
the conjecture that disruption creates entrepreneurial 
opportunity. In the power vacuum that followed 
the death of Mao Zedong, farmers in the People’s 
Republic of China who had formerly been tied to rural 
collectives—with truly catastrophic results—were left 
by the state to enjoy new autonomy. They went back 
to what came naturally—family-based farming on 
small plots of land. In 1979, under the leadership of 
Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese government implemented 
reforms to codify the return of family-based farming. 
The immediate consequence was increased agricultural 
productivity, but the implications reached well beyond 
rural areas and grain silos. The practical impact of these 
reforms was, as Huang has documented, to initiate 
a long-term process in which roughly a fifth of the 
world’s population would have new opportunities to 
seek, and create, opportunities for themselves.65 Rapid 
entrepreneur-led renewal also has recently occurred in 
once-devastated parts of Rwanda (centered on Kigali) 
and Colombia (centered on Medellín).
 The take-away here is not, of course, that leaders 
in society should engineer large-scale disruptions in 
order to realize future benefits, nor am I suggesting 
that the more dramatic disruptions to which I just 
alluded are desirable. Rather, I am proposing that 
because experiencing disruptions is an inevitable part 
of social life—though customarily such disruptions are 
less severe than those experienced in recent decades in 
China, Rwanda, and Colombia—those involved in the 
project of enabling entrepreneurial ecosystems should 
anticipate them and prepare to make the most of the 
opportunities for the beneficial change they create.
 Before concluding, I offer a final comment on the 
important topic of program assessment.
“the introduction of rapid response systems in hospitals is a complex, multicomponent intervention—essentially a process of social 
change. the effectiveness of these systems is sensitive to an array of 
influences: leadership, changing environments, details of implementation, 
organizational history, and much more. In such complex terrain, the rct 
[randomized controlled trial] is an impoverished way to learn. critics who 
use it as a truth standard in this context are incorrect.” 
—Donald Berwick66 
vii. ForGet aBout 
“GoLd standards”
 I have emphasized that entrepreneurial ecosystems 
are highly complex, interdependent environments 
whose function can be reduced only with a high 
degree of imperfection to a single index or even to 
an array of indices. To the extent that small changes 
in experimental conditions lead to large changes in 
outcomes—that is, to the extent that the policy itself 
involves the implementation of a complex recipe—
then the likelihood that a study conducted in setting 
X will be relevant to setting Y (or even to setting X in 
the future) is correspondingly diminished. Hausmann 
succinctly describes the manner in which complexity 
undermines the notion of gold-standard research in 
development practice:
A typical program, whether a conditional cash 
transfer, a micro-finance program or a health 
intervention can easily have fifteen relevant 
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dimensions. Assume that each dimension 
can only take two values. Then the possible 
combinations are 215 or 32,768 possible 
combinations. But randomized trials can 
only distinguish between a control group 
and one to three treatment groups. So, 
many of the design or contextual features 
are kept constant while just one or three 
are being varied. This means that the search 
over the design space is quite limited, while 
the external validity of these experiments is 
reduced by the fact that many of the design 
or contextual elements are bound to change 
from place to place. So, for the majority of 
the design elements, choices must be made in 
the absence of the support from randomized 
trials, which will necessarily play a secondary 
role in the actual practice of policymaking.67 
 The internal validity of RCTs says nothing about 
their external validity. As Berwick states regarding the 
use of RCTs to inform innovation in public health (see 
quote above), “In such complex terrain, the RCT is an 
impoverished way to learn.”68 The same argument  
holds with regard to the use of RCTs as a practical 
tool to assess and develop strategies to enable 
entrepreneurial ecosystems. While RCTs may be 
methodologically elegant, they are not necessarily 
of any greater practical value than are structured 
interviews, surveys, relational maps, (theory-informed) 
data mining, or any of an array of methodologies that 
can increase understanding of a particular ecosystem at 
a particular time. 
 When it comes to methodologies to assess 
strategies intended to enable entrepreneurial 
ecosystems, there is no gold standard. Quality 
assessments will be those that are carried out according 
to a clearly defined baseline, connected to the reality 
of the particular ecosystem (or ecosystems) in question, 
and updated on a regular basis. In most cases, such 
assessments—informed equally by common sense and 
the desire for methodological simplicity—will yield 
information that is more practically useful and at least 
as generalizable as the ostensible gold standard.
“A score of tatas might do more for India than any government, british or indigenous, can accomplish..” 
—Alfred Marshall69
concLusion
 The search for strategies to enable local entrepreneurial ecosystems is a fundamentally practical one, for which 
current academic research does not provide ready answers or even compelling conceptual frameworks within which 
to ask relevant questions. Better understanding of actual ecosystems provides a conceptual framework within which 
policymakers can ask relevant questions, envision better approaches, and meaningfully evaluate resultant outcomes.
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relationships and peer production networks (Appleyard 2003; Auerswald 2008; Agwara et al. (2014).
 classic works by simon (1965, 1967); marshak and radner (1972); radner (1993), as well as 
some more recent papers (Auerswald et al. 2000; rivkin 2000; Auerswald 2008; Auerswald 2010) have 
defined more complex problems simply as those for which finding a good solution is more difficult. 
notions of computational complexity related to the difficulty of solving a particular problem are at 
the heart of algorithmic information theory; as such, they can be defined quite formally (specifically, 
Kolmogorov complexity and np completeness). As applied to production recipes, the greater the 
complexity of the technology, the lower the correlation between the effectiveness of the original recipe 
(i.e., the leader’s method) and that of the same recipe altered slightly (i.e., an imperfect imitation). In 
this work, the complexity of a production recipe is represented by both the number of tasks in the 
production process and, critically, the degree of interaction among those tasks; in the biological model, 
these tasks in their most irreducible form correspond to alleles in a gene; interactions among tasks 
correspond to epistatic interactions among alleles.
 this last definition is the one that drives the implications of complexity for both entrepreneurial 
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 25. Auerswald (2010) provides a proof of this proposition.
 26. “non-rival” means that one person’s use of an idea does not keep another person from 
using the idea; “non-excludable” means that it is impossible to keep a person from using an idea once it 
is “out in the open;” and “knowledge” refers to the costless transmission of ideas that are non-rival and 
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shell, stuart Kauffman, José lobo, and I have independently.
 27. to emphasize: the focus here is not on web pages and pirated music videos. these digitized 
products—even including patents—are not the same thing as production recipes.
 28. romer (1986, 1990). see also Zucker et al. (1998). there is no disputing that ideas created 
by one person, or within one firm, can reach other people or firms through multiple pathways, many 
of which do not involve direct compensation of the innovator by the beneficiary. If one chooses to 
refer to such pathways as “knowledge spillovers,” then such spillovers will be in evidence everywhere. 
yet, when such pathways involve economic benefit derived from entrepreneurship, in most cases they 
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were previously carried out between the entrepreneurs on a market. A firm can expand in either or both 
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Auerswald (2008).
 33. burt (2004, p. 351 [footnote 2]). see also pentland (2014); freeman and huang (2014).
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extent on markedly increasing regulatory complexity in atoms-based businesses. A similar phenomenon 
is even more pronounced in international cross sections; India, pakistan, and nigeria, for example, are 
places where entrepreneurial energies have over the past two decades been overwhelmingly dedicated 
to bits-based businesses.
I n s I g h t s  f r o m  E c o l o g y  to  I n f o r m  E f f E c t I v E  E n t r E p r E n E u r s h I p  p o l I c y   |   3 1
 58. of course, there is a significant difference between the “control system” in the biological 
case and the “regulator” in an economic context: we generally presume that the “regulator” is a 
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chastain et al. suggests that it is not the malevolence of the regulator but rather the regulatory function 
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 62. from 1951 to 1953, california received $13 billion in prime defense contracts, overtaking 
new york as the leading recipient of defense funding. that surge abated with cuts initiated by Wilson. 
see leslie (2000). 
 63. for the san Diego story, see Walshok (2013). she observes that “san Diego’s transformative 
journey began early in the 1980s, when the entire southwest was dealing with the implosion of the 
savings and loan industry, which resulted in bankruptcies and an overall decline in the powerful building 
and real estate financing industries, both of which had been major drivers of regional prosperity since 
the 1950s. this crisis was paralleled by a significant decline in defense manufacturing; in san Diego, 
this included the aerospace industry and the Atlas missile. In fact, general Dynamics, whose workforce 
in the san Diego area at one time numbered 60,000, completely closed down over an eighteen-month 
period, leaving thousands of engineers, technicians, and other workers without jobs by the late 1980s.”
 64. stangler (2009).
 65. huang (2008).
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 67. hausmann (2009), p. 193.
 68. berwick (2008), p. 1153.
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 the quote is from a letter written by Alfred marshall in 1911. the “tatas” in question are 
the sons of Jamsetji tata, the Indian entrepreneur whose ventures turned into a now-global business 
empire that has spanned generations. this sentence provides evidence that appreciation in the field of 
economics of the profound role entrepreneurship plays in economic development is neither new nor 
confined to the work of Joseph schumpeter. yet marshall’s formal contributions to economics—and those 
of the marginalists who followed him—did little to advance understanding of the complex dynamics 
alluded to in the simple sentence above. 
 marshall was the author of Principles of Economics, one of the foundational works in the field of 
economics. 
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